Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of the Mind

Jonathan Ellis
UC Santa Cruz

Philosophical questions about the mind preoccupied much of Wittgenstein’s later writing, and his contribution to them is deep and wide-ranging, bearing upon philosophical issues concerning sense-experience, concept formation, perception, introspection, the science of psychology, aspect perception, the self, the understanding of rules, the relation between mind and brain, artificial intelligence, and many other subjects of current concern. According to a growing number of eminent philosophers, however, many of Wittgenstein’s most important insights have still not been properly absorbed by contemporary philosophical debates on these topics. If anything, work on these subjects is less informed by Wittgenstein’s examples and discussions than ever before. In this volume, philosophers from inside and outside of Wittgensteinian circles explore Wittgenstein’s treatment of philosophical questions about the mind and issues in contemporary philosophy of mind upon which Wittgenstein’s philosophy may have significance. Bringing to bear their broad range of perspectives on his philosophy, these philosophers collectively demonstrate its fundamental import for present-day philosophy of mind.